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Auditor Independence
By A. C. Littleton
The nineteenth century statutes by which the British sought
to control joint-stock companies for the better protection of
investors plainly show that Englishmen of that time had a very
clear idea of the nature of a corporation and of the proper relation
of directors to stockholders. The company was merely a mecha
nism for drawing scattered capital together and putting it to work;
the stockholders were investors who pooled their savings for a
common objective; the directors were elected representatives
(“stewards ”) of the stockholders and were charged with the direct
responsibility of managing the investment for the investors’
benefit. But a knowledge of human nature and the existence of
an historical background, which included the stock-jobbing
period immediately preceding 1720, combined to lead the British
to frame their corporation statutes in such a manner as to provide
the stockholders with other representatives who were to “test the
stewardship,” as it were, of the managing representatives. At
first the critic was an auditing committee of stockholders, later
an independent professional auditor.
The developments of the past few years in our own country
have raised questions similar to those which must have agitated
Englishmen several generations ago. Can elected directors and
hired managers of corporations that are touched with a public
interest, because of the extent of the company’s operations, the
number of employees or investors or the character of the service
rendered—can such men, chosen by one group of investors, be
depended upon to manage the corporation with a balanced con
sideration for the best interests of all concerned? Can a way be
provided for independent third parties to review the acts and pro
posals of the managing representatives in a critical manner and
with the interests of both present and prospective investors in
mind?
British and American experiences dictate a negative answer to
the first question in enough cases to show that the problem of
securing a responsible management is not a negligible one. The
British precedent of the auditor-critic suggests an affirmative
answer to the second problem and thereby raises the additional
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question of whether the English plan of electing auditors in
the stockholders’ meeting should be adopted in this country
or some other plan should be devised to improve investor pro
tection.
The first reply to the last question probably would be that Eng
lishmen are not altogether satisfied with their own system. In
spite of election of the auditor by the stockholders, we are led to
believe that the goodwill of the directors is important, that the
selection of the auditor practically always rests with the directors
in the final analysis, that the courts have so circumscribed the
auditors’ duties as to make the stockholders’ protection rather
formal and that “until auditors are insured a much greater degree
of independence than they at present possess, it is hardly to be
expected that they can be an effective safeguard against waste of
shareholders’ funds in company administration.’’ (See Financial
Democracy, Miller and Campbell, chapter 4.)
The second reply to the question of transplanting the British
system is that conditions peculiar to the United States would
seem to make election of the auditor by the stockholders even less
satisfactory here. Getting stockholders out to meetings is a
problem everywhere, but the impression persists that it is par
ticularly difficult in this country.
Most of our security holders act alike in spite of differences in
the terms of their contracts: bondholders by agreement have no
vote for directors and policies; stockholders neglect to exercise
their prerogative and thus voluntarily place themselves in the
same category as bondholders as far as management control is
concerned. Stockholders do not seem to feel ownership responsi
bilities ; and they are quite apt to look to the market for the clue
to the value of their holdings rather than to financial statements.
This has a tendency to make many directors more market-con
scious than good management would dictate.
In addition to the other things, we have devised a very extended
array of securities contracts with numerous and complex diversi
ties. This vast expansion in the types of credit instruments has
greatly diluted the sense of ownership. The situation is no
longer one of the simple pooling of capital in a joint-stock by in
dividual investors receiving very similar interests in the enter
prise. The diversity of securities makes for diversity of interests;
and diversity, abetted by complexity of the contract, opens the
way to a possible subtle undermining of the prior rights of senior
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securities by new issues. (See Berle and Means, The Modern
Corporation and Private Property; also Graham and Dodd, Security
Analysis.)
The situation therefore calls for an American plan to fit Ameri
can conditions.
The only American plan so far developed aims at investor pro
tection through the application of the provisions of the federal
securities act and the securities exchange act, supplemented by
regulations issued by the securities and exchange commission.
It is not proposed here to discuss the probable success or failure of
this method of attack upon the broad problem. The statutes
have been charged with blocking the flow of private capital into
industry, but recent regulations of the commission seem to prom
ise relief for corporations with an established record. The very
large budget proposed for the commission has raised the fear in
some quarters of an extensive bureaucracy which may sometime
attempt to regiment business into too much uniformity, but an
ticipatory fears of this sort usually outrun eventual actualities.
Yet it must be acknowledged that the British experience with de
centralized administration of income-tax laws has been more
satisfactory than ours has been with a high degree of centraliza
tion, which would seem to be an argument against too great cen
tralization of control over securities.
However, it is desirable to raise the question whether the possi
bilities have been fully canvassed for investor protection by a more
effective use of experienced public accountants. The work of our
public accountants has now been given a statutory recognition
it never had before. But that is only a tardy recognition of just
a part of the service which they are competent to perform. Here
is a body of men, estimated to be approximately 14,000 in number,
who by education, experience and ideals of service are unusually
well qualified to fulfill in America the spirit of the early British
theory of the corporation auditor: an independent and expert
critic, in the interest of all investors, of the stewardship of the
directors.
Qualified to serve these men may be, but free to serve with a
real independence they are not.
Public accounting is faced with certain weaknesses which are
probably inherent in the present scheme of things.
1. Auditors are engaged by the officers or directors whose activi
ties are to be examined.
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2. Auditors may be dropped and others substituted at the
pleasure of the officers or directors; and the deposed auditor
has no recourse even though he may suspect that attempts
to mislead investors are contemplated.
3. Auditors have no power effectively to criticize directors’
valuations or financial proposals even though the equity of
some prior stock is being weakened. When their powers of
persuasion are exhausted, auditors have but little choice
except acquiescing or resigning.
4. Auditors may be subjected to subtle pressure in many ways;
the scope of their examination may be restricted more than
is wise; the time allowed may be arbitrarily limited at the
psychological moment; their reports may be suppressed and
their recommendations disregarded.
These situations, even when they do not create definite open
issues, can do much to undermine the auditors’ feeling of inde
pendence and prevent his convictions from showing teeth. Un
consciously he may seek ways of meeting concrete situations
without realizing that, while constituting technical “disclosure,”
his phrases may nevertheless fail to carry the necessary message
to the reader. He is constrained, perhaps, to qualify his certi
ficate. But that device may give the average reader the im
pression that the auditor was merely dodging responsibility, or
it may fail utterly because of its cautious phrasing to accomplish
its purpose of putting the investor “on notice.”
This is no indictment of public accountants; no other equal
group of men in contact with affairs will assay a higher average of
disinterestedness and impartiality. Certified public accountants
have made an enviable record of high-minded, expert service and
many individual accountants have repeatedly demonstrated
that they set their convictions above fees. Yet the fact remains
that the conditions under which they perform their critical and
quasi-judicial function constitute a definite culture-medium in
which the germs of professional weakness can and sometimes do
grow. The principal issue here raised is whether a practical way
can be found to reduce these handicaps upon a real professional
independence and to utilize an increase of auditor independence
for the public good.
The principal feature of the ideas outlined below is the thought
that the federal securities act and the securities exchange act
might be amended by congress and developed by commission regu
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lations in a manner to confer a larger degree of real independence
upon public accountants.
1. Corporations submitting statements under these acts could
be required to use for that purpose only statements prepared and
certified by auditors who shall have been licensed under the
securities and exchange commission; they could be required in
general to facilitate the auditor’s work and specifically to keep
him advised concerning proposed changes in financial structure or
other major financial adjustments; they should be prevented from
taking the initiative in terminating the professional services of their
licensed auditor unless by authority of a board of financial review
after a full hearing; they should be required to submit disputes
with the auditor to arbitration by the board of financial review.
2. Auditors who desire to qualify for practice under these stat
utes could be required to register with the commission and re
ceive a licence. The basic requirements for obtaining a licence
should be:
a. The applicant must be professionally qualified for this type
of engagement as indicated by his education, experience,
state certificate and professional connections.
b. The applicant must have membership in a professional body
having professional qualifications for admission and dis
ciplinary powers over the members.
c. The applicant must make public acknowledgment, by oath
or otherwise, of his acceptance of the responsibilities resting
upon an auditor to disclose the full facts clearly and to ex
press his professional opinion fearlessly in behalf of all
parties at interest. The phrase “parties at interest” is to
mean potential or present investors of every grade or contrac
tual relationship.
Employees of auditing firms, if given substantial discretion in the
conduct of professional engagements under these statutes, must
be licensed auditors.
3. Licensed auditors’ duties should be made broader than those
of the usual audit and should be outlined in general terms by
commission regulations under the statute. Briefly these duties
would be to examine and disclose. Examination would call for
the following:
a. Examination of the corporate records and accounts to see
that the results of the transactions reflect the principles of
good accounting.
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b. Scrutiny of security contracts, of proposals to change the
financial structure and of financial valuations or operations
to see that the principles of sound finance were not being
violated and that the interest of no class of security holder
was (accidentally or by design) being undermined without
the latter’s knowledge of the real significance of the situation.
c. Follow up the accounting of new financing to see if the use
made of the funds was as stated in the prospectus.
Disclosure would call for the following:
a. Presentation and certification of a full, clear statement of
present financial condition, including a careful indication of
the types of security contracts outstanding.
b. Presentation of full, clear statements of income for the cur
rent fiscal period, as well as an analysis of past surplus,
and a certification of the earned income of the past three
years.
These responsibilities laid upon the auditor would place his trained
judgment and skill as an analyst at the disposal, as it were, of the
whole investing public. The right of appeal by either party of
unsettled issues between auditor and client to the board of
financial review for arbitration would further assure the public
of sound practices.
4. As a judicial adjunct to the security and exchange commis
sion a board of financial review should be formed to serve as a
court of arbitration of such disagreements as may arise between
licensed auditors and their clients. Disputes may arise over ques
tions of
a. Good accounting theory or sound financial principles.
b. Neglect by the auditor of professional duty.
c. Need for a change of auditors.
d. Adequacy of service or fee.
The members of such a court should be appointed for a long term
of service by the president of the United States from a list of men
whom the accountants’ national organizations (American Institute
of Accountants, American Society of Certified Public Account
ants, National Association of Cost Accountants, American Asso
ciation of University Instructors in Accounting) would nominate
as particularly well qualified for this type of governmental
service. Obviously such a list should be made up of the best that
the accountancy profession could produce of broad education,
varied experience and judicial temperament.
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A group of interested, earnest specialists in accounting, such as
would be chosen for this court, would build up in a relatively short
time a most useful body of sound and authoritative precedents
related to specific situations. This would afford an exceptional
basis for shaping that body of doctrine called principles of good
accounting and sound finance into a well coordinated form, so
needed by practitioners in the field as guides in their current work
and by students in the class room in preparation for their future
work.
In order to assure wholly disinterested and fearless judgments,
the members of the court should receive a generous salary during
their term of service and every member not reappointed should get
a substantial pension upon retirement. This would give every
person entering this new responsibility the same economic and
intellectual independence as a life appointment.
5. Auditors who are protected in their professional independ
ence, when they are conscientious in their duties and correct in
their principles, should willingly accept definite and positive
liabilities to be applied when they become derelict as auditors.
a. Neglect of professional duty should, after a hearing before
the board of financial review, result in suspension of licence
of the individual accountants directly responsible and loss of
the client if the fault be decided to be minor neglect, and
permanent loss of licence if the decision was major neglect.
b. Anyone convicted before the board of financial review of
neglect of the duties of auditors, which are customary in the
circumstances of that case, who loses his licence as a result,
may not practise for himself under these acts or serve as a
responsible supervisor on the staff of an accountant who
does so practise.
c. If a hearing before the board of financial review should dis
close a presumption of connivance by the auditor in the issu
ance of a false financial statement or in concealing fraud in
the accounts, the statute should make the auditor civilly
and criminally liable to the client and to third parties who
could prove they had relied upon the false statements.
The time is past when it is proper to divide those who supply the
capital for modern corporations into two opposite categories:
owners and lenders. All investors, not excluding open trade
creditors, are contractual creditors of the corporation and differ
one from the other only by the terms of their respective contracts.
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Under a simpler financial structure, where practically all capital
came from common stockholders, the directors in effect repre
sented all sources of capital. The problem of finding a way to
select directors who can truly be called representatives of all
suppliers of capital is still unsolved, and until it is solved the early
ideal of the British plan of two counter-poised representatives
can not be fully achieved for our modern corporations. But the
above outline suggests that a way could be found to bring the
auditor-half of the plan into a close approximation of the ideal of
a really independent critic “in the interest of all who supply cap
ital.” If that independence were made possible, surely it would
be quite generally acknowledged a better method of increasing
investor protection than either dependence upon auditors subject
to dismissal by the persons under scrutiny or upon an inadequate
number of auditors attached to a federal bureau as bank examin
ers now are.
The plan outlined is a middle course resting upon a foundation
already available. And it is a plan which should not be difficult
to put into operation. In essence it would provide first, a system
of quasi-judicial scrutiny—by men trained under exacting pro
fessional standards—of corporate transactions and proposals, to
the end that brakes may be applied to unsound practices still in
the making, and, second, a method for a considered review of dis
puted questions and a suitable discipline for unprofessional or im
proper conduct.
This proposal would elevate public accountants to a larger
responsibility. But it is not advanced for their sake. It is sug
gested in the conviction that public accountants would be able to
make a real contribution to the problem of protecting investors
from deceit. Even hedged about as they now are by subtle
factors tending to undermine their full freedom of opinion, public
accountants still are more unprejudiced in their views than the
management which plans an issue of new securities, more unbiased
than the underwriters who expect to sell the issue to others at a
profit to themselves, and more public-minded than the attorney
who draws a security contract with a keen sense of the best inter
ests of the “insiders.”
A real independence for the auditor is as necessary to the ful
fillment of his function as an unofficial representative of the
investing public as the recognition of privileged communications
is to the fulfillment of the lawyers’ function. Indeed it is the
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public accountants’ already well-developed sense of professional
independence that qualifies them for an increased real independ
ence as quasi-public representatives of the interests of inarticulate
and scattered investors. They are in fact professional men who
already are well suited to “ . . . protect those whom they serve
against spoliation.” But they need better public support in their
task.
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